

## NO FIRST USE': POLICY AND PROBLEMS OF INDIA'S DRAFT NUCLEAR DOCTRINE

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**Received: 19 Oct 2019**

**Accepted: 25 Oct 2019**

**Published: 31 Oct 2019**

### **ABSTRACT**

*During the first twenty-five years of independence, from 1947 to 1971, India encountered three wars with Pakistan (1947, 1965 and 1971) and one with its neighbour China (1962). These military engagements, sometimes inevitable, compelled Indian government, quite justifiably, to review and reorient its defence policy, where in face of the potential threats from its neighbours, India was supposed to showcase a defence mechanism that could convey the message of India's strength to the world. India's two nuclear tests, one in 1974 and the other in 1998, immediately made the world powers aware of India as the new member of the nuclear power club of the world. After conducting these explosions in May, 1998, India declared a voluntary moratorium and declared to refrain from conducting underground nuclear test explosions, which was perfectly in tune of India's long advocacy about 'peaceful use of nuclear energy'. Post-independent India's nuclear policy, evolved as it was at the turn of the twenty-first century. Therefore, may be seen as an outcome of the contemporary international situation, where apart from the peaceful usage of the nuclear energy, its destructive power was also explored and stored in hand.*

**KEYWORDS:** *Defence Policy, India's Strength, Nuclear Doctrine*

### **INTRODUCTION**

#### **Non-Proliferation and India**

On April 2, 1954, the then Prime Minister Nehru, with the task of building a new-born nation, said in the Lok Sabha, "Nuclear, chemical and biological energy should not be used to forge weapons of mass destruction."<sup>1</sup> Nehru urged for the negotiations at all concerned levels for prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons and also for a standstill agreement to put a check to the usage of nuclear weapons. However, this call was not heeded by the 'Nuclear Club' of five countries (USA, UK, USSR, France and China). Though Nehru and his Defense Minister V.K. Krishna Menon, opposed a nuclear weapon programme, but the Prime Minister of India was in favour of developing a civilian nuclear program. Because he believed that nuclear technology would provide India with the ability to leapfrog many technologies and thus accelerate economic development. It has been rightly observed that, "a civilian nuclear program can also be utilized for military purposes and Nehru was well aware of that. Thus, while rejecting a nuclear weapon programme he nevertheless did not foreclose the 'option' strategy".<sup>2</sup>

#### **National Security**

In 1965 India with its Non-aligned movement partners put forward the idea of an international non-proliferation agreement. But it failed again due to the same old opposition from the 'nuclear club' member-countries. It was an unstable political condition that India was going through at home during this time, owing much understandably, to the demise of a leader of a

stature like Jawaharlal Nehru in 1964. Taking his unfinished job from the days prior to the independence, Nehru took up the charge from day one to put the independent India on the world map at par with the other countries in every possible sector. Nehru had a vision of modern India that he wanted to execute with a missionary zeal, and it was his deep-rooted commitment to secure peace and prosperity for all that guided his actions. Therefore, it was a daunting task, especially in an unsure political atmosphere, for his successors to live up to the dream that he dreamt of. Finally, for the time, the baton went to the hands of Nehru's much-informed daughter, Indira Gandhi, who by that time, primarily because of her rich legacy as well as varied exposure by default, had acquired a fair amount of understanding of international as well as of domestic issues that were of prime importance to the country. On April 5, 1968, Smt. Indira Gandhi, the Prime Minister of India, assured the Lok Sabha that, "We shall be guided entirely by our self-enlightenment and the considerations of national security."<sup>3</sup>

### **Operation Shakti**

On 11 May 1998 India successfully conducted three underground nuclear tests. Two more underground tests on 13 May 1998 completed the planned series of tests. These tests were conducted with a fission device, a low yield device, and a thermonuclear device.<sup>4</sup> Prime Minister Vajpayee declared<sup>5</sup> that measurements had also confirmed that there was no release of radioactivity into the atmosphere. According to the Prime Minister, these were essential for ensuring a credible nuclear deterrent for India's national security in the foreseeable future.

Prime Minister Vajpayee reminded the Parliament on 27 May 1998 that India demonstrated its nuclear capability in 1974 and the successive Governments thereafter had taken necessary steps in keeping with that resolve and 'national will' to safeguard India's nuclear option open. Prime Minister Vajpayee said in the House that "this was the primary reason behind the 1996 decision for not signing the CTBT, a decision that also enjoyed consensus of this House."<sup>6</sup> In his speech at the UN General Council in New York on 24 September 1998, Prime Minister Vajpayee urged for complete global non-proliferation. Reminding the Council regarding India's past efforts and citing the causes of its failure he declared that the CTBT was not accepted by India on grounds of national security.<sup>7</sup> Vajpayee in his speech at BARC on 10 August 1998 admitted the role of BARC and said that BARC had added a new dimension of his earlier promise 'Atom for Peace and Development'. This new dimension after Pokhran II is 'Atom for National Security'.<sup>8</sup>

### **Causes of Pokhran II**

The decades 1980s and 1990s had witnessed the gradual deterioration of India's security environment as a result of nuclear and missile proliferation. Vajpayee said in the parliament that, "In our neighbourhood, nuclear weapons had increased and more sophisticated delivery system inducted. In addition, India has also been the victim of externally aided and abetted terrorism, military and clandestine war."<sup>9</sup>

At his official residence in New Delhi addressing a group of people on 30 May 1998, Prime Minister Vajpayee explained the reason behind the 'Pokhran-II' explosion. He said,

We want to live amicably with the neighbours as a good neighbour. But if the neighbour occupies our house, creates disturbances then our safety and security would be of paramount importance to us and that is what we are doing. Nobody should have any doubt about it. This is the objective behind our nuclear tests. Destruction is not the objective; it is self-defence, which we have in our minds.<sup>10</sup>

Vajpayee also questioned the nuclear explosion of Pakistan after Pokhran-II. Pakistan conducted five nuclear explosions at Chagai-1 test site (Baluchistan) on 28 May 1998. Vajpayee argued that no nuclear weapons can be developed within just 16 days, only it is possible if they have a long preparation. He also informed that other neighbours were also preparing to conduct tests. Vajpayee also denied the allegation of a 'Hindu Bomb'. To him it was a desperate effort to create division among the people. He said,

The scientists who experimented included Dr. Abdul Kalam, a Muslim. Also people from different creeds and religions participated in this experiment. This was made for the security of the nation. Nobody should have any misunderstanding or any doubt about it.<sup>11</sup>

Prime Minister Vajpayee in his speech delivered to a group of people at his official residence in New Delhi on 2 June 1998 again declared that the Pokhran-II explosion was guided by the concerns of self-defence and India has no aim of attacking anybody.<sup>12</sup> When atomic weapons were being developed and stocked around India, the Government of India realized that the peace in the region is endangered. The Government of India decided to allow its scientists and engineers to conduct nuclear tests to the extent necessary for safeguarding India's integrity and for safeguarding peace. According to the Prime Minister, the objective was accomplished at Pokhran.<sup>13</sup> Prime Minister Vajpayee again said that India is in favour of peace and complete non-proliferation.<sup>14</sup> India is committed to the goal of universal nuclear disarmament as the main guarantor of the world peace.<sup>15</sup>

According to the Prime Minister Vajpayee,

Twenty-four years ago, in 1974, Mrs. Indira Gandhi did the first nuclear test at Pokhran. We had been waiting for 24 years, perhaps we need another nuclear test. Atomic explosions world over is cease. The stockpiles of nuclear weapons would cease and such weapons would be destroyed. But nothing of this nature happened.<sup>16</sup>

On the other hand, NPT failed because of the 'nuclear apartheid' mentality of the five 'nuclear club' countries, who wanted to impose ban on other countries regarding the nuclear weapons and nuclear R&D (Research and Development), but wanted to monopolize nuclear weapons and technology. They are not ready to destroy their nuclear weapons. These countries do not want others to develop weapons, which they possess, but they are not prepared to reduce their own stockpiles. They are even engaged in making their weapons more lethal.<sup>17</sup> Vajpayee in his statement in the Parliament on 8 June 1998 made it clear that India though ready to engage in mutual negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, but the call made in the Resolution that India should stop nuclear programmes or missile programmes were unacceptable due to Indian security concerns. A glaring lacuna in the Resolution is the total absence of recognition that the non-proliferation issue is not a regional issue but has to be dealt with an approach of non-discriminatory global context. Vajpayee pointed out that the UN Security Council Resolution does not reflect on the judgment of the International Court of Justice, which has questioned the legitimacy of nuclear weapons and called for urgent negotiations for their elimination.<sup>18</sup>

Prime Minister Vajpayee placed the paper entitled "*Evolution of India's Nuclear Policy*" in the Parliament of India on 27 May 1998. He declared in that paper that,

India is now a nuclear weapon state...We do not intend to use these weapons for aggression or for mounting threats against any country; these are weapons of self-defense to ensure that India is not subjected to nuclear threats or

coercion. We do not intend to engage in an arms race.<sup>19</sup>

Vajpayee also declared India's will for opening negotiations with all interested countries for a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC) to reach consensus regarding the non-proliferation of the nuclear weapons.

### **Cheap Energy**

As a developing country India needed a number of peaceful applications of nuclear energy.<sup>20</sup> The demand of energy is growing day by day. The Government of India is of the view that, nuclear power can be a source of cheap energy.<sup>21</sup> This is one of the important reasons except the 'security concern' behind India's nuclear research.

### **Draft Nuclear Doctrine of India**

National Security Adviser to the Indian Government in the last years of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Mr. Brajesh Mishra released the Draft Report on 17 August 1998<sup>22</sup>. One can find the reflection of Prime Minister Vajpayee's statements in various speeches after Pokhran-II in the DND (Draft Nuclear Doctrine). In the Preamble (Article 1.1.) of the DND it is clearly mentioned that the nuclear weapons in particular remained as the gravest threat to humanity, peace and stability. It also mentioned about the unwillingness of the 'nuclear club' countries to go for a complete non-proliferation. The Article 1.2 of the Preamble declared India's primary objective was to achieve economic, political, social, scientific and technological development within a peaceful and democratic framework. The Article 1.3 reflected the Indian view against 'Nuclear Apartheid'. In the Article 1.5 a criticism was there against the offensive doctrine of 'first use of nuclear weapons' and even against the non-nuclear states by some nuclear powered countries.

The Article 2.1 of the 'Objectives' of DND tried to justify the Indian stand mentioning that the UN Charter guaranteed the 'Right of self-defence'. It declared that in the absence of global nuclear disarmament, India's strategic interests required effective, credible nuclear deterrence and adequate retaliatory capability should deterrence fail.

The Article 2.3 declared that India would follow a 'doctrine of minimum nuclear deterrence'. In this policy of "retaliation only" the survivability of our arsenal was critical. This section also mentioned two important points:

- Any threat of use of nuclear weapons against India shall invoke measures to counter the threat.
- Any attack on India and its forces shall result in punitive retaliation with nuclear weapons to inflict damage unacceptable to the aggressor.

The Article 2.4 clearly mentioned that the fundamental purpose of Indian nuclear weapons was to deter the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons against India and its forces. It was stated that India would not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike, but would respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail.

The Article 2.5 declared that India should never use or threaten of using nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear states or against any states non-aligned with nuclear powers.

The Article 2.6 mentioned about the requirements for deterrence:

- sufficient, survivable and operationally prepared nuclear forces;
- a robust command and control system;

- effective intelligence and early warning capabilities;
- comprehensive planning and training for operations in line with the strategy; and
- the will to employ nuclear forces and weapons.

The Article 2.7 mentioned the necessity of maintaining highly effective but conventional military capabilities to encounter both of conventional military conflict as well as that of threat or use of nuclear weapons.

The Article 3.1 of the 'Nuclear Forces' part of the DND declared that India's nuclear forces would be effective, enduring, diverse, flexible, and responsive to the requirements in accordance with the credible minimum deterrence. It was stated in the section that

These forces will be based on a tried aircraft, mobile land-based missiles and sea-based assets in keeping with the objectives outlined above. Survivability of the forces will be enhanced by a combination of multiple redundant system, mobility, dispersion and deception.

The Article 3.1 stated the necessity of the capability to shift from peacetime deployment to fully employable forces in the shortest possible time, and the ability to retaliate effectively even in case of significant degradation by hostile strikes.

'Survivability' Part of the DND Article 4.3 (i) stated that India's nuclear forces and their command and control shall be organized for very high survivability against surprise attacks (a first strike) and for rapid punitive response.

'Command and Control' part of the DND (Article 5.1) declared that Nuclear weapons shall be tightly controlled and released for use at the highest political level i.e. in the person of the Prime Minister of India, or the designated successor(s).

Two declarations in this part of DND were most important:

- The Indian defence force shall be in a position to, execute operations in an NBC<sup>23</sup> environment with minimal degradation.
- Space based and other assets shall be created to provide early warning, communications, and damage/detonation assessment.

'Research and Development' part of the DND (Article 7.1) declared that India should increase its efforts in research and development to keep up with technological advances in the field.

The Article 7.2 announced that India would not accept any obstacles on building its R&D capability.

The 'Disarmament and Arms Control' part of the DND declared that India desired to work for a nuclear-weapon free world (Article 8.1).

The Article 8.2 stated that efforts shall be made to conclude an international treaty among the nuclear weapon states to ban 'first use' of nuclear weapons.

The Article 8.3 stated that "...having provided unqualified negative security assurances, India shall work for internationally binding unconditional negative security assurance by nuclear weapon states to non-nuclear weapon states."

### **Chinese and Indian Security Concerns**

The Government of India affirmed that India's nuclear threat preparation were not country specific.

China declared a 'no first use of nuclear weapons policy' after its nuclear test on October 1964. Sha Zhukang, China's Director-General of Arms Control and Disarmament, reiterated China's no first use policy in March 1999 again when he mentioned that, "Because of our own bitter experience of being blackmailed, we have declared to the world that we would never be the first to use nuclear weapons."<sup>24</sup> China also observed a policy of 'negative security assurances' signifying non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries. However, China has lately added several caveats and qualifications to its professed doctrine. The most important of these was China's military planners' emphasis on the point that such a declaration of 'no first use' was not applicable to the territories that belonged to China.<sup>25</sup> China have repeatedly emphasized that the fielding of US National Missile Defence System (NMD) or the deployment of Theatre Missile Defense (TMD) systems by Japan and Taiwan will be considered extremely detrimental to China's national security interests and China will take all steps that are necessary to enhance the effectiveness of its nuclear weapons. Manoj K. Sing observes, besides unilaterally abrogating some of its nuclear weapons-related treaty obligations, China can be expected to substantially increase the number of ICBMs in its nuclear armory and also graduate to MIRVs (Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle) for increasing the number of targets which would be presented to NMD and TMD systems so that its nuclear warheads have a relatively better rate of survival after launch. China may even abandon its decades old no first use commitment and adopt a more aggressive nuclear doctrine. Which way China will ultimately go is at present too close to call, but it is to China's credit that besides India it is the only other NWS (Nuclear Weapon State) that stands for no first use.<sup>26</sup>

### **Pakistan and Indian Security Concern**

Vajpayee said in the parliament, "a secure and prosperous Pakistan is in India's interest."<sup>27</sup>

Pakistan's military rulers have so often emphasized, Pakistan's rationale for its nuclear weapons was not only to deter the threat of India's nuclear weapons but also to counter India's conventional military superiority. Pakistan's foreign and military policies (particularly the policies relating to India) used to be designed in the army's General Headquarters (GHQ) at Rawalpindi. Ever since the starting of its nuclear programme, Pakistan's nuclear weapons were under military custody and the country's civilian rulers had no control over them. It is, therefore, no surprise that Pakistan adopted a first use nuclear doctrine. Its military and political leaders repeatedly stated that Pakistan would resort to the early use of nuclear weapons in a conventional conflict to prevent its comprehensive military defeat at India's hands and to ensure that its survival as a viable nation state was not threatened.<sup>28</sup> Other Strategic experts of Pakistan like, Brigadier Saeed Ismat also expressed the similar view. Pakistan's nuclear doctrine would, therefore, essentially revolved around the first strike option. In an interview with CBS TV in October 2000, General Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's military ruler, asserted that, Pakistan could use its nuclear bomb against India if its security was jeopardized.<sup>29</sup>

### **Nuclear Weapons Cannot Provide Deterrence-Indian Experience**

It is now universally accepted that nuclear weapons are political weapons and not weapons of 'war fighting'. However, India recognizes that nuclear weapons cannot provide deterrence in all circumstances and limited conventional conflict remains possible even under the overhang of nuclear weapons. This was borne out by the 1999 Kargil conflict between

India and Pakistan. Pakistan did not accept India's offer of a bilateral 'no first use' treaty as a nuclear confidence building and risk reduction measure.

### **If Deterrence Fails**

What should be India's response if Pakistan escalates to the nuclear level? In that situation Indian 'No First Use' would mean a second strike capability i.e. absorbing Pakistan's first nuclear attack and delivering "unacceptable damage" to them. This policy is predicated on Pakistani perception of "unacceptable damage" which should deter them from carrying out the first attack. Pakistan's view of "unacceptable damage" regarding the extent and degree of damage to us in the first nuclear attack by Pakistan is imperceptible.

China's continuous support to Pakistan in regard to the latter's quest for nuclear and missile capability has always been a serious threat for Indian security, even though China seemingly inclined to end its proliferation policies under American pressure. Some Indian Strategists see in a long term perspective, future conflicts between India and China over "Lebensraum".<sup>30</sup> To encounter this threat India has to prepare for it by strengthening economic and technological potentials. Without dismissing outright security threat from China as non-existent, an immediate threat from China is not apparent, given China's perception of its security problems and its anxiety to have a peaceful neighbourhood, to pursue its ambitious economic plan and reach the standards of developed countries by the middle of the next century.<sup>31</sup> G.D. Bakshi mentioned that Indian defense expenditure is US 30 billion Dollars, where as China's defense budget is over US 30 billion Dollars (as per the Chinese White Paper on Defense). The actual Chinese defense expenditure calculated by Pentagon is over US 139 billion Dollars.<sup>32</sup> According to Major General (Retired) G.D. Bakshi, "This translates into a quadruple differential between the defense spending of the two countries. In military terms, it is leading to serious imbalances."<sup>33</sup> In India's nuclear and missile capabilities are far lower than that of China. China itself is in the process of modernizing its nuclear and missile forces including miniaturization of war heads for tactical weapons and MIRV capability, though the target of its modernization may not be India. India would require a much longer time frame to achieve parity and deterrence capability against China – may be 20-30 years at a modest reckoning and assuming a steady increase in India's technological capability. In any case India needs considerable time to catch up with China's weapon and missile capabilities. Jasjit Sing<sup>34</sup> advised that it will take certain time to reach the target of 'minimum deterrence' for national security. For the interim period he proposed a 'doctrine of recessed deterrence'. He explains "Recessed deterrence may be defined as a credible nuclear weapons capability which the country is able to draw upon for political and diplomatic purposes, and is able to deploy a nuclear arsenal within a defined time-frame and effectively use it physically for military purposes."<sup>35</sup>

### **Radiation Effect**

If a nuclear exchange starts between India and Pakistan, no matter who starts it first, would leave neither country a victor but both devastated in the killing fields of radioactive debris which does not recognize international borders. The effects of radioactivity would remain for a long period after the devastations as witnessed in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the following generations would be bearing the side-effects of the explosions. As the result of these nuclear exchanges the returning radioactive debris is taken care from wiping out large segment of our population by cancer related deaths, not to speak of subsequent generation of maimed children. It is thus obvious that nuclear war is unthinkable between the two countries.<sup>36</sup>

### Limitations of 'No First Use' Policy

Differences rose among the Indian strategic community on the issue of no first use of nuclear weapons. Many analysts like C Raja Mohan, have mentioned that India has gained nothing and has unnecessarily elected to bear the terrible costs of a nuclear strike by choosing to adopt a purely retaliatory nuclear policy. He asked the question, will India resort to a nuclear strike in case of deterrence fails? He thinks if an intelligence warning of a 'definite nuclear' strike is received, the NCP (National Command Post) will have to consider, among other options, a first launch.<sup>37</sup>

Another opinion in this regard is Pakistani nuclear retaliation would inevitably targets on Indian cities and military establishments. Cities like Jodhpur, Bikaner, Ahmadabad, Jalandhar, Ludhiana and perhaps even New Delhi and Mumbai would be the likely targets of a retaliatory Pakistani nuclear strike. In all the above scenarios, given the limited gains that an Indian first strike may achieve and the real possibility of successful Pakistani nuclear retaliation, the resounding answer to the first use nuclear option by India. Experts of the 'Peace and Conflict Studies' emphasized the need of a strong and effective leadership in this regard.<sup>38</sup>

India has made an immense strategic sacrifice and imposed a heavy burden upon itself by voluntarily giving up its right of the first use of nuclear weapons to defeat nuclear threats and to prevent nuclear blackmail. With the breaking down of deterrence India will have to pay an enormous price for a nuclear first strike by an adversary before retaliating in kind. Hundreds of thousands of Indian lives will be lost and more than one city may be vanished. So, India's no first use doctrine demands a robust, infallible and potentially insuperable nuclear deterrent capability to ensure that India never has to suffer a nuclear strike.

The credibility of a nuclear deterrent that is limited to retaliatory strikes only confines around the ability of the nuclear force to survive a first strike in sufficient numbers to inflict unacceptable punishment in retaliation. Since submarines offer the best survival potential, India has to rely on a small number of SLBMs (Submarine-based ballistic missiles) for credible deterrence. C Raja Mohan has also criticized the proposed doctrine. However, surprisingly, he finds no use for aircraft-delivered nuclear bombs and states that "to even consider the role of the army in nuclear deterrence, minimum at that, is truly distressing." His hypothesis is that an arsenal for minimum deterrence requires only second-strike weapons, which can only be based on SSBNs (Submarine/Submersible ship ballistic missile and nuclear powered).<sup>39</sup>

Some critics have averred that the nuclear threats have not been enunciated and that the draft document does not define the nuclear force levels that India considers "minimum". Others have protested that the costs of India's nuclear deterrent have not been spelt out. But DND defines only a set of beliefs and guidelines on which policy and strategy is based. In the preamble of the draft paper, it is clearly stated in Article 1.6 that "this document outlines the broad principles for the development, deployment and employment of India's nuclear forces."

### Tactical Nuclear Weapon (TNW)

Pakistan's 'Tactical Nuclear Weapons' is another concern for Indian security strategy. During the mid-1980s, defense analysts like General K. Sundarji and K. Subrahmanyam were advocating a minimum deterrent capability for India and had discarded the need for tactical nuclear weapons as these were meant for nuclear war fighting – a concept that India did not subscribe to. Air Commodore Jasjit Singh thinks the division of nuclear weapons into tactical and strategic is irrelevant. He has pointed out correctly the danger of that this kind of division –this kind of belief system could grow in a way that might



justify the use and utility of such weapons for actual war-fighting.<sup>40</sup> According to him, "A nuclear weapon of any quality, mode of delivery or yield, used against any type of target, will result in a strategic impact to which the logical responses would be the use of nuclear weapons, more often than not, on an overwhelming scale."<sup>41</sup> Lt Gen Arun Kumar Sahni mentioning the supporters (Manoj Joshi, Brahma Chellaney etc.) and opponents (Manpreet Sethi) of Indian TNW, suggested that "India has to be sensitive to the reality that the introduction of TNWs by India would not only lower the nuclear threshold, vis-à-vis Pakistan, but also against China."<sup>42</sup> Chellaney feels that India should have multiple nuclear options.<sup>43</sup>

### **India's Economic Obligations Regarding the Building of 'Second Strike Capability'**

An economically weak country like India who is on the path of development, is not likely to embark on such a course unless its security-environments compel it to. A nuclear policy based on such threat perception would entail enormous cost with the system of triads (particularly nuclear armed submarines from survivability angle), acquisition of sufficient number of warheads, and missiles with MIRV capabilities to establish the deterrence of a second strike capability. This cost may cut-off the budget for social sector like health, education and employment. This is a serious problem before India.

### **In Search for Security**

Another big challenge for not only India but for the world peace is Pakistan's fastest growth as nuclear power in today's world. It is opined that<sup>44</sup>

In the next 5–10 years Pakistan could have a nuclear arsenal not only twice the size of India's but also larger than those of the United Kingdom, China and France, giving in the third-largest arsenal behind the United States and Russia.<sup>45</sup>

Since independence the political leaders of both these rival countries and power-mongering Punjabi officials of the Pak-Army, are using the 'Kashmir-card' to stay in the power. Even the Indian political parties and their leaders used this 'Kashmir-card' to gain electoral benefits. There are allegations that, Vajpayee-Government permitted 'Operation Shakti' (Pokhran-II explosion) to gain that electoral benefit as the 'made-war' Kargil gave much electoral profit to BJP.<sup>46</sup>

George Perkovich<sup>47</sup> in a recent ND TV discussion (22/09/2016) has correctly said that India has limited capabilities, and India never possesses similar capabilities like USA and Israel. So, it's better for India to go for a 'limited operation'; otherwise India may have to suffer greatly (like the post-USA operation in Iraq or Afghanistan). If we turn our attention to South-Asia, we should notice that actually 'South-Asia is on the Fuse'. Most of the nuclear powers on a limited area are present in South-Asia. China and 'Three Fakirs'<sup>48</sup> (India, Pakistan and North Korea) are the declared nuclear-power in this region. We have some strange reports that Iran and Myanmar<sup>49</sup> are also trying to build nuclear weapon. Pakistan's smuggling of nuclear-technology to North Korea<sup>50</sup> and some other unidentified countries through 'A.Q. Khan Network' is a big challenge to world peace and global security.<sup>51</sup> The strange relationship among the countries of South-Asia is another cause of conflict in the region. The mutual-hostilities and suspicions among these countries may lead to a multi-lateral catastrophic war in South-Asia.

Leaders of these countries and world communities would have to try to make the situation normal and have to find a solution of the problem through bi-lateral and multi-lateral talks and cultural-business cooperation. This is the only way to carry on the peace process in this region. Another very important aspect we have to examine carefully that there has always been a qualitative difference between the Indian and Pakistani statecraft and polity. Pakistan is a 'Premature

Democracy’, actually ‘No Democracy’ at all, which one might like to call ‘No State’, that has no responsibility to the world peace and even to their citizens.

Though the decade after Indo-Pakistani nuclear tests, South Asia managed to avoid a nuclear or a full scale war, this does not mean that nuclear proliferations have stabilized in the region. In fact, the threat of nuclear weapons has continued to play an important role to destabilize the subcontinent.<sup>52</sup>

The economic impact of a war between these two countries is another area of huge concern. India is one of the fastest growing economies in the world, far ahead than Pakistan. In the ‘Kargil War’ (though it was not a full scale war, but a limited operation) India spent Rs. 5000 crore per week. Now the estimated expenditure of a war with Pakistan is Rs. 5000 crore per day. Therefore, the consequences of a war on India will be deep routed as well as devastating for its growing economy and progress. Even if the war is to last for a fortnight, it would cost India at least Rs 2,50,000 crore. This war will raise India’s fiscal deficit by 50 percent to about Rs 8 lakh crore. The war will give a severe blow to FDI/FTI investments and can bring down the value of rupee to Rs 100 to an US dollar.<sup>53</sup>

According to some research reports, if India and Pakistan use nuclear weapons against each other, it will be destructive not only for them but for the whole world. There will be a great famine in the world, and 200 crore people will die<sup>54</sup>. A joint research report of ‘International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War’ (Nobel Peace Prize winner, 1985) and ‘Physicians for Social Responsibility’ expressed their concern on 2013 regarding the possible result of a nuclear war between these two countries. According to this report, even a limited nuclear-war between them will definitely destroy the cultivable lands and destructive effects will be on the atmosphere. It will definitely lead to a big shortage of food grains. Huge increase of the price of food grains will then create the condition of the people worse and economy unstable. Though this report is silent to a large extent about the effects of this war on China, but we can guess that China will have to face severe food insecurity. Due to the nuclear-war ‘Carbon Aerosol’ particles will increase in the atmosphere. As a result, in USA 10% of food grain production will decrease for a decade; in China wheat and rice production will be decreased by 21% for first four years and 10% for next six years.<sup>55</sup>

## CONCLUSIONS

Parkovich, examining the Pokhran- II explosion for ‘national security’ remarked, “Taking a short cut to international power and status allowed Indian leaders to give the nation what thought it wanted.”<sup>56</sup> Vajpayee in an<sup>57</sup> interview expressed his view:

Millions of Indians have viewed this occasion of the rise of a self-confident India. I fully share this assessment and this dream. India has never considered military might as the ultimate measures of national strength. I would, therefore, say that the greatest meaning of the tests is that they have given India ‘shakti’, they have given India strength, they have given India self-confidence.

Though some scholars criticized ‘Pokhran- II’ as the instrument of BJP’s electoral politics, but they have ignored the ‘security concerns’ of India. Leaving surrounded with hostile nuclear powers India had no other option rather obtaining nuclear weapons for ‘minimum deterrence’ to protect itself from nuclear-threats and blackmailing. This view was reflected in Vajpayee’s statement:

Guru Govind Singji had said 'I am afraid of none, I also do not terrify others, but I am fearless (Nirbhaya).' Fearlessness is the power to carry the world with you.<sup>58</sup>

He also advocated the need of friendship and peace among the nations. In time of our evaluation of India's stand we have to take in account of the fact that a sensitive poet Vajpayee who earlier criticized the nuclear explosions in Japan and those scientists involved in the bomb making in his famous Hindi poem 'Hiroshima ki Peera'<sup>59</sup> permitted the Indian scientists for Pokhran-2. It was the strategic compulsion in a non-proliferated South Asia that compelled Vajpayee for a nuclear explosion to ensure Indian security. India's stand was a challenge for the 'nuclear club'. The Government of India's main aim was to ensure 'national security'. To encounter these challenges to India's national security Government of India decided to go for another explosion at Pokhran for mastering the nuclear technology. Earlier in 1980s, K. Subrahmanyam, describing the unwillingness of these 'nuclear dacoits' who are dominating the international system to disarm themselves, had advised to develop self-protection capabilities for India.<sup>60</sup>

On 4 January 2003, the Cabinet Committee on Security reviewed the DND.<sup>61</sup> The 'No First Use' posture was modified in two ways:

- Article 2.ii. clarifies that a posture of "No First Use" of nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or elsewhere.
- Article 2.vi. declares in the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons.

Though the Pakistani strategic expert Zafar Iqbal Cheema thinks with these modifications in DND the 'No First Use Policy' became invalid and India may took an aggressive mode.<sup>62</sup> Ashley J. Tellis's observation is very important in this regard: India's limited nuclear capabilities – so long as they meet certain minimal standards of lethality, survivability, connectivity and penetrativity- are seen to be sufficient to assure the country's safety.<sup>63</sup>

But we have to remember that 'National Security' is the utmost priority — If the nation is secured then we are secure. Every idealism or humanitarian approach comes after reaching national security. So, these modifications were needed to DND. Rajesh Rajagopalan wished further modifications in DND for strengthening Indian Security. He advocated the need of periodic reviewing the DND. He wishes: "If a new edition of the doctrine does come out, it will hopefully correct some of the errors and contradictions in the previous edition, thereby strengthening the doctrine as a whole."<sup>64</sup> India is a peace loving country who is trying to negotiate with the nations from a long time to reach in a collective decision of completing nuclear weapon banning, not yet achieved success. Though Narang thinks India with his stands triggers a South Asian arms race<sup>65</sup>, but he ignores the Indian initiatives for international peace. India is a peace loving country who is trying to negotiate with the nations from a long time to reach in a collective decision of completing nuclear weapon banning, not yet achieved success.

Nuclear weapons are monoesters that can ruin the entire creature. So, using it for security purpose is not a good idea of the nations. Though Prime Minister Vajpayee claimed no release of radioactivity into the atmosphere after Pokhran-II,<sup>66</sup> but reality is different. Traces of 'Hibakusha' noticed among the peoples of Pokhran region.<sup>67</sup> Another example regarding the nuclear R&D is after the Indo-China war in 1962 and Chinese atomic explosion CIA with Indian IB decided to install a nuclear Devise on Nanda Devi, but due to the bad weather the mission failed and devise lost. According to former R&AW officer R.K. Yadav, it caused radiation in Ganga river basin<sup>68</sup>.

So, India has to carefully and securely handle its nuclear R&D program for national security and development. The need for an integrated framework of defensive realism, non-offensive defense, a balanced conception of minimum deterrence, and a commitment to reassurance is undeniable. Though the minimum deterrence posture recognize that nuclear weapons are not more than a necessary evil, but they have a place in the scheme of national security.<sup>69</sup>

In this context Chinese and Indian policy may normalize the situation. The Chinese and Indian doctrines now indicate a counter view to the traditional aggressive doctrines of other nuclear weapon states who visualize use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear threats. Chinese and Indian nuclear doctrine poses a serious challenge to the prevailing doctrines of offensive orientation and first strike strategic doctrines of the US/NATO<sup>70</sup> and Russia<sup>71</sup>. So, we have to go a long way to reach a collective consensus regarding the banning of nuclear weapons.

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- <sup>3</sup> Quoted in Atal Bihari Vajpayee. *In Prime Minister*, p.14.
- <sup>4</sup> A thermonuclear device/ fusion weapon, is a second-generation nuclear weapon design. Its greater sophistication over pure fission weapons may afford it vastly greater destructive power than first-generation atomic bomb, a more compact size, a lower mass or a combination of these benefits.
- <sup>5</sup> *Ibid*. p.12.
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<sup>23</sup> NBC means Nuclear, biological, Chemical.

<sup>24</sup> Sing,131.

<sup>25</sup> As China claims Taiwan as its own territory, it would be logical to assume that the Chinese may resort to the first use of nuclear weapons during a war over Taiwan. Similarly, China lays claim to the entire Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh (approximately 90,000 square Kilometers in area) and India would need to vector this factor into its strategic calculations. China is also yet to formally recognize the accession of Sikkim to India.

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<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*,163.

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*and France have refused to heed such wise counsel. In fact, the US has said that it would consider the use of its nuclear weapons against chemical and biological weapons and NATO, under US leadership, has developed an "out of area" strategic concept that undermines peace and stability in the international order.*

<sup>71</sup> *The former USSR had also followed a 'no first use policy and even in 1955 the USSR had proposed a no first use pledge by all Nuclear Weapon States. But now Russia resorted to the 'First Use Option'.*

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